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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINIS TIVE LAw-CoMBINATION oF F NcIONS: MAY AN AD-
MwNISmT VAuvE TnmBUAL BE BoTH PROSECUTOR AND JuDGE?-State
ex rel. Beam v. Fuiwiler, 76 Wn.2d 313, 456 P.2d 322 (1969).
Respondent Beam was Chief Examiner and Secretary to the Spokane
Civil Service Commission. About two years before the instant action,
the Commission requested Beam to retire. When he refused, the
Commission was instrumental in reducing his pay and in demoting
him by creating a position superior to his for another person. Beam
successfully brought action to have his duties restored and to set aside
the new position created by the Commission.' Subsequently, the Com-
mission members investigated Beam's conduct, formed conclusions,
promulgated charges, transmitted accusations personally signed by
four of the five board members to the City Manager and recommended
his discharge. The City Manager, pursuant to the recommendation,
notified Beam of his discharge. Beam sought review, but since the Spo-
kane City Charter designates the city Civil Service Commission as the
sole tribunal to hear appeals from an employment discharge, he re-
quested the Commission to disqualify itself. The Commission refused.
Beam then sought superior court review of his discharge in place
1. The case here noted is one of three to arise out of the increasingly strained rela-
tionship between the Spokane Civil Service Commission and its Secretary, Mr. Beam.
Beam was appointed Secretary in 1942 as the sole employee of the Commission that
then had a budget of $3,200. There were then over 400 employees under civil service. By
1967 the Commission employed seven persons, had a budget of $61,000, and there were
1,750 city employees under civil service. Brief for Appellants at 2-3, State ex rel. Beam v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n., 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 964, 468 P.2d 998 (1970). Initially the city at-
tempted to remove some of Beam's administrative duties by creating a position superior
to his. Beam successfully brought suit in superior court to set aside this action. The
Commission then changed its tactics: it recommended Beam's discharge, and pursuant to
this recommendation the City Manager dismissed Beam. The Commission then refused
to disqualify itself from hearing Beam's appeal of his discharge. However, Beam won
again in court. The Supreme Court disqualified the Commission and held that the su-
perior court had jurisdiction to hear the matter on its merits. State ex rel. Beam v.
Fulwiler, 76 Wn. 2d 313, 456 P.2d 322 (1969) (the principal case). The Commission
then renewed its efforts to relieve Beam by appealing the superior court decision that
set aside their original plan to create the position superior to Beam's; again the Com-
mission lost. State ex rel. Beam v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 964, 468 P.2d
998 (1970). Finally, Beam appealed his discharge to the superior court which held a
hearing on the merits. The trial court dismissed with prejudice Beam's appeal of the city
manager's discharge. State ex rel. Beam v. Civil Serv. Comm'n. No. 187,856 (Spokane
County Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1970). Beam has filed notice to appeal that decision.
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of a hearing before the Civil Service Commission, alleging that, under
the circumstances, he would not be accorded a fair hearing before
the Commission. On certiorari asking a determination of the superior
court's jurisdiction in the matter, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the Civil Service Commission was disqualified from hearing
Beam's appeal and that the superior court was possessed of inherent
jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy on the merits.
State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler, 76 Wn. 2d 313, 456 P.2d 322 (1969).
Beam is a case of potentially broad significance. The decision can
be read to stand for the following: (1) persons who have investigated
and prosecuted another are disqualified from adjudicating his case,
and where there is such a combination of inconsistent functions, ex-
haustion of administrative remedies is not required; and (2) the
"rule of necessity" will not prevent the courts from deciding the
case on the merits.
I. COMBINATION OF FUNCTIONS V. EXHAUSTION
OF REMEDIES
Two firmly rooted legal doctrines collided in Beam: the ancient
principle that no man should be the judge in his own case2 and the
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to judicial
review.3 The former prevailed over the latter. This section explores
possible rationales for this result and examines some of its implica-
tions.
The central issue in Beam was whether a combination of investi-
gating, prosecuting and adjudicating functions within the same persons
gives rise to an imputation of disqualifying bias without further
2. State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Educ., 19 Wash. 8, 52 P. 317 (1898). There is
a tension between this principle and the goal of efficient administrative dispute settle-
ment. To promote the latter, legislatures have combined functions of quasi-judicial ad-
ministration within single agencies. To protect against the potentially prejudicial effects
of such combinations, statutory schemes generally provide for internal separation of roles
within agencies. See notes 40, 41 and accompanying text, infra.
3. See L. JA'PE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL Or ADmIIsTRATIvE ACTION 424-58 (1965). The
requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies is an aspect of the judicial tendency
to defer to the expertise of agency personnel. Statutory strictures serving the same policy
are found in limitations on the scope of judicial review of agency decisions. See, e.g.,
Northern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n., 69 Wn. 2d 472, 418
P.2d 735 (1966).
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evidence of actual bias. While it is possible that the court, after look-
ing at the history of ill-will between Beam and the Commission, con-
cluded that there was evidence of actual prejudgment in addition
to the combination of inconsistent functions, this view cannot be
inferred from the majority opinion. The court condemns the combina-
tion, without more, of prosecuting and adjudicating functions.4
Although the Spokane Charter authorized the Civil Service Com-
mission to conduct investigations, the Charter clearly contemplated
that employee supervision and discipline were to rest largely in the
hands of each department head.' In the normal course of events the
City Manager would discharge an employee upon the recommendation
of the appropriate department head. The employee would then have
the right to appeal his discharge to the Civil Service Commission
for a hearing at which the contentions of the department head and
of the employee would be considered in resolving the matter." How-
4. After citing State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Educ., 19 Wash. 8, 52 P. 319 (1898),
and State ex rel. Caffrey v. Superior Court, 72 Wash. 444, 130 P. 747 (1913), the Beam
court stated:
We find no distinction, in principle, between the two cases just referred to and the
instant case. Both give rise to the disqualification of a tribunal where, as here, it is
made to appear that the hearing tribunal is composed of an individual or individ-
uas who investigated, accused, prosecuted and would judge the controversy involved.
76 Wn. 2d at 318, 456 P.2d at 325.
Justice Neill, dissenting in Beam, however, found a distinction between'the earlier
cases relied on by the majority and the instant dispute. He thought the Barnard and
Caffrey cases involved evidence of prejudgment in addition to the combination of in-
consistent functions. Beam, in his view presented no such additional evidence of bias. 76
Wn. 2d at 323, 456 P.2d at 328.
5. SpoxANE, WASH., Crry CMATER art. VI, § 55 (1960).
6. SPoxAE, WAsH., CTr CaART art. VI, § 55 (1960) states:
Suspension, Reduction in Bank and Discharges-Appeals. An employee may
be suspended, reduced in rank or discharged only by the city commissioner in whose
department the employee is employed, or the city manager, if the mayor-council-
manager form of government is adopted, as follows: (a) Any employee may be
suspended for a period of not more than five days for disciplinary purposes with
loss of salary and without right of appeal by filing a copy of such order of sus-
pension with the commission, provided that no employee may be given more than
one such suspension in any calendar year. (b) Any employee may be suspended for
a period of not more than 60 days for cause, and with loss of salary. (c) Any em-
ployee may be reduced in rank for cause. (d) Any employee may be permanently
discharged from city service for cause. The person making an order of suspension,
reduction in rank or permanent discharge under Subdivisions (b), (c) or (d) hereof
shall forthwith file with the commission a statement of such order which shall con-
tain the reasons therefor, and serve a copy of the order on the employee. Within ten
days after filing and service of said order, the employee may file a written appeal
with the commission who shall hold a hearing thereon within ten days after filing
the appeal. The commission shall render its decision in writing within ten days after
the hearing. The commission may sustain the order of suspension, reduction in rank
413
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ever, the Beam case is anomalous; Beam's department head and
immediate supervisor was the Commission itself. As a result the same
Commission which personally investigated and filed the charges that
resulted in Beam's dismissal was also the sole tribunal designated by
the Charter to hear appeals of employee discharges.
Interpreting Beam's Charter-given appeal right,' the Washington
Supreme Court stated: "Implicit in such provisions is that such a
hearing shall be fair and impartial, and before an unbiased tri-
bunal."" The court observed: 9
[lit is highly unlikely, under the unusual circumstances pre-
vailing, that the respondent or anyone in a like situation could
approach or leave a hearing presided over by a tribunal so com-
posed with any feeling that fairness and impartiality inhered in
the procedure.
The foundation of the holding in Beam, then, was that the right
to a hearing granted by the Spokane Charter is a right to a fair
hearing. The court, however, leaves unclear whether constitutional
due process, statutory interpretation or a common law conception
of procedural propriety was the doctrinal basis of its decision.
That court's statement that the Charter provision granting a hearing
requires an impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal suggests
that implied legislative intent is the basis of the decision. However,
the court stated that the protections of a fair and impartial hearing
and the concepts of fundamental fairness they project are inherent
in the notion of "administrative due process", citing Smith v. Skagit
or permanent discharge or may order the employee reinstated to his employment.
Any reinstatement shall carry back salary from the date of the order of suspension,
reduction in rank or permanent discharge to date of re-employment. Requiring an
employee to work more than his regular work week or during his vacation, except
in an emergency, shall be equivalent to a suspension, and the employee shall have
a right of appeal direct to the commission within ten days after termination of such
occurrence. A hearing shall be held as herein provided, and if a violation of this Article
or the rules is found to exist, the commission shall order proper salary adjustments,
which order shall be served upon the city auditor and honored by him. No employee
may be suspended twice for the same act. The decision of the commission shall be
final.
7. Beam does not arise under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act, which
applies to state agencies, boards, commissions, departments or officers. WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 34.04.010(1) (1967). Since the Spokane Civil Service Commission is not a state body,
the Act is not applicable.
8. 76 Wn. 2d at 316, 456 P.2d at 324.
9. Id. at 315-16, 456 P.2d at 324.
414
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County.10 In Smith the court stated: "The word hearing in a statute
shows a manifest purpose to afford due process of law."" The Smith
court did not suggest it was referring to some kind of due process
outside the ambit of constitutional law, but it placed an interpretive
gloss on statutes conferring a hearing right which compels that they
be read in light of constitutional due process standards. Arguably,
then, the Beam decision holds that a combination of inconsistent
functions in an adjudicatory tribunal is unconstitutional. If not a
constitutional holding, the decision at least shows a willingness to
adopt standards which are the functional equivalents of constitutional
due process through the device of implicit legislative intent.
To interpret Beam as holding that the combination of functions
alone is determinative explains why exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not required. The majority opinion in effect declares the
futility of further recourse to administrative action under the facts."
If acting as both prosecutor and judge is sufficient to impute dis-
qualifying bias, then there is no need for a court to have any proof of
actual bias from an administrative hearing record.
Justice Neill, dissenting vigorously from the decision reached by
the majority, argued that the cases relied on by the majority con-
tained evidence of prejudgment as well as combination of functions
and were therefore distinguishable from Beam.'3 He also disagreed
with the court's holding that a combination of inconsistent functions
alone is sufficient to disqualify the tribunal, advocating instead the
rule adopted by the Alabama and Minnesota courts which requires
exhaustion of administrative remedies in combination of functions
cases but enlarges the scope of judicial review to scrutinize the record
with a view toward protecting the fundamental rights of the parties. 4
In addition Justice Neill, supported by a line of Washington cases
which holds to the traditional view that government employment is
not a vested property right, argued that it was inappropriate for the
10. 75 Wn. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
11. Id. at 741, 453 P.2d at 847.
12. When the interests of justice so require, the rule of exhaustion will not be ap-
plied. See 2 F. Coopm, STATz AM nsTRATiV LAW 573 (1965).
13. See note 4, supra.
14. 76 Wn. 2d at 326, 456 P.2d at 330; State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Educ., 252
Ala. 254, 40 So. 2d 689 (1949); State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7
N.W.2d 544 (1942).
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majority to base the Beam decision on due process grounds rather
than on common law principles.'" Under the traditional view, govern-
ment employment is denominated a privilege rather than a right, and
the government may discharge an employee at will subject only to
the employee's contractual or statutory rights. 6 Following this right-
privilege dichotomy, Justice Neill concluded that a statutory hearing
granted to determine issues regarding a mere privilege is not control-
led by the dictates of due process, but that common law fairness should
govern such proceedings.' 7
However, the right-privilege dichotomy should not be determinative
in the Beam context. Beam was not contending that he had a right
to a hearing on the matter of his employment, but was insisting that
the hearing to which he was already entitled under the Charter be
fair. Even if government employment is regarded as only a privilege,
the Beam case falls within the qualification previously mentioned:
employee dismissals are subject to statutory rights.' 8 Here a statutory
right to a hearing existed. Although no right may have existed in-
dependent of the statute, if such a hearing is granted, it must comport
with due process." 9
Furthermore, the right-privilege dichotomy is an analytical tool
15. Justice Neill states:
The concepts of fairness which are so critical in actions based upon due process,
then, are also very relevant when considering the common law rules providing for
disqualification of administrative officials exercising quasijudicial functions in areas
not protected by the due process clause.
76 Wn. 2d at 322, 456 P.2d at 327.
16. Yantsin v. Aberdeen, 54 Wn. 2d 787, 345 P.2d 178 (1959) and the cases cited
therein; Reynolds v. Kirkland Police Comm'n., 62 Wn. 2d 720, 384 P.2d 819 (1963).
But cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964).
17. 76 Wn. 2d at 322, 456 P.2d at 327.
18. See note 16 and accompanying text, supra.
19. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). This case involved the right of an in-
digent defendant to a free transcript when his case presented a substantial question for
appeal. Although this decision is generally cited for its equal protection language, both
the Court's opinion by justice Black and the concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter
speak of due process and equal protection. For example the Court stated:
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide ap-
pellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. . . . But that is not to say that
a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. Appellate review
has now become an integral part of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating
the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Consequently at all stages of the proceedings
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from
invidious discriminations.
351 U.S. at 18.
See also Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
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which has been declining in use by the judiciary. 0 Courts have given
due process protection to "privileges" in such areas as federal employ-
ment and higher education. 2 In the words of one federal court: 2
Private interests are to be evaluated under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, not in terms of labels or fictions,
but in terms of their true significance and worth.
Although Washington apparently still adheres to the conventional
right-privilege distinction, 3 Beam may herald a movement toward
broad application of due process protections in government employ-
ment.
In any event the case stands for the proposition that persons who
have investigated and pressed charges are per se disqualified from
adjudicating that case. Beam is thus a significant departure from
what has been identified by textwriters as the majority position:2  in
the absence of actual bias, the combination of inconsistent functions is
not enough to disqualify a tribunal. A critical examination of combina-
tion of functions cases cited in support of the "majority" position
reveals, however, that where the same individuals would participate
as prosecutors and judges, state courts do, in fact, often disqualify
the tribunal.
A New Jersey case frequently cited for the proposition that a
combination of functions alone does not disqualify the tribtimal is
Mackler v. Board of Education 5 There the court refused to disqualify
the two members of a nine member board who signed a complaint
against the business manager, but it did so on the basis that:2 6
The making of a complaint does not disqualify a board member
where its making is a formality of office and no personal interest
is shown.
20. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964).
21. E.g., Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (employment); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961)
(higher education).
22. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
23. See note 16 and accompanying text, supra.
24. See, e.g., 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMIWMrTrvE LAW 340 (1965); 2 K. DAVIS, AD-
mnamTRATriv LAW TREATISE 175 (1958); 1 Am. JuR. 2D Administrative Law § 64 (1962).
25. 16 NJ. 362, 108 A.2d 854 (1954).
26. 108 A.2d at 856-57.
417
Washington Law Review
In short, the combination of functions in Mackler was more formal
than real. Another case from the same jurisdiction emphasized the
importance of the limiting language in Mackler. In Hoek v. Board
of Education,2 7 one of five board members personally conducted an
investigation, made private comments, interviewed witnesses, and
brought charges. That board member was disqualified and the Board's
discharge was vacated.
A similar result was reached in a California case where one member
of a city commission who had investigated, accused and filed charges
against the city physician was about to sit at the physician's discharge
hearing. 8 The court stated :29
Were [the investigating member] permitted to sit on the com-
mission during the trial he would appear in the capacities of a
complaining witness who filed the charges, a juror to weigh the
evidence, and a judge to pass sentence. Thus he would be more
than a judge sitting on his own case. Good ethics should not
permit him to occupy those positions. We have no hesitancy in
holding that under the facts before us he is not qualified to do
SO.
The New York, West Virginia and Idaho courts have also held that
one individual may not act as the accuser and the judge in the same
cause.30
There is inconclusive support for Beam in federal decisions on the
issue of combination of functions where the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act does not apply. These decisions fall into two specialized
categories: deportation and contempt proceedings. In the area of
deportation the United States Supreme Court, following a statutory
enactment permitting a combination of functions, held that due process
is not violated by an arrangement involving supervision of adjudicating
27. 75 N.J. Super. 192, 182 A.2d 577 (1962). Interestingly, New Jersey also adopted
a statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-10 (1968), that provided for a hearing before the
State Commissioner of Education which:
would eliminate the vice which inhered in the former practice . . . of the board's
being at one and the same time investigator, prosecutor and judge.
182 A.2d at 582.
28. Nider v. Homan, 32 Cal. App. 2d 11, 89 P.2d 136 (1939).
29. 89 P.2d at 141.
30. Sharkey v. Thurston, 268 N.Y. 123, 196 N.E. 766 (1935); In re Cross v. Pearsall,
29 App. Div. 2d 533, 286 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1967); State ex rel. Ellis v. Kelly, 145 W. Va.
70, 112 S.E.2d 641 (1960); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922).
418
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officers by officials charged with investigating and prosecuting duties."
Other deportation cases are cited by Justice Neill in Beam, 2 but all of
these decisions are of limited precedential value outside of the im-
migration field in view of the clear congressional power to accord aliens
fewer rights than citizens 33
In summary contempt cases, the United States Supreme Court has
reached apparently inconsistent results. In In re Murchisont4 the
Court held that due process was denied when a judge serving as a
"'one man grand jury" charged the defendant with contempt and then
presided at the trial for contempt. In Nilva v. United States3 5 and
Sacker v. United States 6 both dealing with similar facts, the Court
rejected combination of functions arguments based on due process
grounds and reached decisions which appear irreconcilable with
Murchison.
However, as previously shown, the view that disqualification follows
from a combination of inconsistent functions alone has widespread
support3 7 Even in the cases cited by the dissent in Beam for the con-
trary proposition the boards' decisions were reversed?, Some courts
31. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
32. 76 Wn. 2d at 319-20, 456 P.2d at 326.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n., 334
U.S. 410 (1948).
34. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
35. 352 U.S. 385 (1957).
36. 343 U.S. 1 (1952). See generally Annot., 64 A...R.2d 600 (1959).
37. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
38. The dissent relies primarily upon four cases to support the proposition that com-
bination of functions alone is not enough to disqualify a tribunal: (1) In Mackler v.
Board of Educ., 16 N.J. 362, 108 A.2d 854 (1954), the court found that the combination
was merely pro forma and thus this case is not in point here; see notes 25-27 and accom-
panying text, supra; (2) however, in State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Educ., 252 Ala.
254, 40 So. 2d 689 (1949), the court vacated the action of the board because certain
testimony was not given; (3) in State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7
N.W.2d 544 (1942), the court reversed and remanded the board decision because the
court found the board had conducted its entire proceedings upon an erroneous theory
of law; and (4) in Hawkins v. Common Council, 192 Mich. 276, 158 N.W. 953 (1916),
the court vacated the council's action because of certain statements made at the hear-
ing by council members which tended to show bias. Thus, in these cases, where they are
in point, the courts reversed the board and it would seem that where there is such a
combination of functions the court is unlikely to uphold an agency decision that is ad-
verse to the appellant.
SEC v. RA. Holman & Co., 323 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1963), another case heavily re-
lied upon by the dissenting justice, is factually distinguishable from Beam. In Holman
the court held, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger while on the circuit bench,
that except in unusual and limited circumstances a litigant may not enjoin an adminis-
trative proceeding by claiming alleged disqualification of a commission member because
of a combination of inconsistent functions where the commission affirmatively asserted
419
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have broadened the scope of review while holding that a commission
is not disqualified because of a combination of functions per se.39 In
all of these state cases, the decision of a commission whose members
exercised inconsistent functions did not stand.
Thus, the ultimate result under either the majority or dissenting
approach in Beam is often the same. The majority view appears far
more efficient and satisfactory to the parties, however, since it involves
only one trial. Justice Neill's approach might result in an adminis-
trative hearing, an appeal to the courts, a reversal and then another
administrative hearing.
The resolution of the Beam controversy is also consistent with the
federal and Washington administrative procedure acts.40 An objective
of both acts is to prevent combination of prosecuting and investiga-
ting functions with judging activities. Both acts require internal
separation within agencies by isolating hearing officers from investi-
gating and prosecuting personnel.41 Such internal separation pre-
sumably safeguards the interests of individuals by promoting the
objective of fair hearings.
that there was no combination of functions within the commissioner in question. It is
this last assertion that makes Holman significantly different from Beam. In Beam there
was no factual dispute over whether there would be a combination of functions if the
commission were allowed to continue. Under these circumstances Beam comes squarely
within the holding of Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962), where
the commission did not deny the petitioner's allegations of disqualification. There the
court was "satisfied that the petitioner had presented 'the exceptional case' which en-
titled it to relief." 323 F.2d at 286. Hence the Beam case comes under the exception to
the Holman rule and it is fully consistent with the Amos Treat holding.
39. See note 14 and accompanying text, supra.
40. 76 Wn. 2d at 319, 456 P.2d at 326.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (Supp. V, 1970) states in part:
The employee who presides at the reception of evidence . . . may not-
(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity
for all parties to participate; or
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee
or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for
an agency.
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, par-
ticipate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant
to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.
WAsn. REV. CODE § 34.04.115 (1967) states:
Except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to be present or to the extent
required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, no hearing
examiner or agency or member of an agency presiding in a contested case or prepar-
ing a decision, or proposal for decision shall consult with any person or party on
any issue of fact or law in the proceeding, except that in analyzing and appraising
the record for decision any agency member or hearing examiner may (1) consult
420
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II. THE RULE OF NECESSITY
The Beam decision also raises a question about the continued
validity of the "rule of necessity" in Washington. This rule was ex-
plained by the Washington court and followed as recently as 1957 in
Kennett v. Levine:
42
It is established by the great weight of authority that where a
public officer, or an administrative board, or a legislative body-
such as the city council-is given exclusive jurisdiction to conduct
a hearing and to determine whether an individual should or should
not be removed from office, and no alternate or substitute is pro-
vided, disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only
tribunal with power in the premises.
Beam, however, relied on the earlier case of State ex rel. Caffrey v.
Superior Court,43 which is directly contrary to Kennett in this matter.
In Beam the court stated: 4
[W]here, as here, there is no provision for another tribunal to
hear the matter, the Caffrey case stands for the proposition that
the superior court is possessed of inherent jurisdiction to hear
and determine the controversy on the merits.
There was no mention of Kennett in Beam. While Kennett was not
expressly overruled in Beam and the rule of necessity probably still sur-
vives as a principle of self-limitation when the court chooses to use
it, the Beam rationale undermines the necessity doctrine.45 If the
requirements of a fair hearing are not satisfied when there is a com-
bination of prosecuting and adjudicating functions within the same
with members of the agency making the decision, (2) have the aid and advice of
one or more personal assistants, (3) have the assistance of other employees of the
agency who have not participated in the proceeding in any manner, who are not
engaged for the agency in any investigative functions in the same or any current
factually related case and who are not engaged for the agency in any prosecutory
functions.
42. 50 Wn. 2d 212, 219, 310 P.2d 244, 249 (1957), wherein the court declined to dis-
qualify the Seattle City Council from holding a hearing into the affairs of a transit
commissioner even though the court assumed that the council was prejudiced against
the commissioner.
43. 72 Wash. 444, 130 P. 747 (1913).
44. 76 Wn. 2d at 318, 456 P.2d at 325.
45. Textwriters are also in conflict over the desirability of the rule of necessity. Com-
pare 2 K. DAvis, AmDSmWnmTAn LAW TREmAs 169-70 (1958) toith 1 F. COOPER, STATE
AnzNs TRAT= LAW 349 (1965).
421
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persons, then it follows that such requirements would be violated in
a hearing conducted under the rule of necessity.
CONCLUSION
The Beam decision replaces the civil service commission with the
superior court in appeals concerning employees of civil service com-
missions that do not have internally separate investigative units.
More importantly, however, the court has extended the prohibition
against combination of functions to administrative units of local
government not covered by the state administrative procedure act.4 6
Hopefully Beam will contribute to raising administrative standards
at the local level where the need for reform is sometimes great.47
46. See note 7, svpra.
47. E.g., Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
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